We propose two variations of the non-cooperative bargaining model for games in coalitional form, introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996a). These strategic games implement, in the limit, two new NTU-values: The random marginal and the random removal values. The main characteristic of these proposals is that they always select a unique payo¤ allocation in NTU-games. The random marginal value coincides with the Consistent NTU-value (Maschler and Owen, 1989) for hyperplane games, and with the Shapley value for TU games (Shapley, 1953) . The random removal coincides with the solidarity value (Novak and Radzik, 1994) in TU-games.
Introduction
In this paper n-person cooperative games in coalitional form are considered.
When utility is transferable across players (TU-games) the most prominent solution concept is the Shapley (1953) value. It yields a unique payo¤ allocation for the players in the game. Shapley's original support for the value was axiomatic. Other relevant axiomatizations of the value are in Myerson (1980) , and Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) . Bargaining models that yield the value in the TU-case have also been proposed. Among these one should mention Gul (1989) , Hart and Moore (1990) , Hart and Mas-Colell (1996a), Winter (1994) , and Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) .
When utility is not transferable (NTU-games), di¤erent ways to extend the value have been considered. The most relevant are by Harsanyi (1963) , Shapley (1969) 1 , and Maschler and Owen (1992) 2 . These three solutions were constructed in such a way that they coincide with the Nash (1950) solution for pure bargaining games and with the Shapley value for TU-games. Axiomatic support for these solutions have been carried out by Aumann (1985) for the Shapley NTU-solution, by Hart (1985) for the Harsanyi NTUsolution, and by de Clippel, Peters and Zank (2004) and by Hart (2005) for the Consistent NTU-solution. Bargaining games that support these solutions have been proposed for the Consistent NTU-solution in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) , and for the Shapley NTU-solution in Vidal-Puga (2006) 3 .
This paper starts o¤ with two aspects that should be taken into account in this value extension program: Single-valuedness and symmetry. Recall that both, the Shapley value and the Nash bargaining solution, satisfy symmetry and select single payo¤s in TUgames, and pure bargaining games, respectively. Nevertheless, the Harsanyi, Shapley,
and Consistent NTU-solutions do not guarantee uniqueness in the solution set.
Multiplicity of the outcomes is not a real problem if we interpret a solution from a predictive point of view. When a set is selected, that only means that the …nal outcome must belong to this solution set. This phenomenon happens in many other contexts, as in the Walrasian equilibria in competitive economic models, or in the Nash equilibria and many of its re…nements for non-cooperative games. But from a normative point of view, this multiplicity in the solution set yields an inconsistency with respect to the symmetry axiom which belongs to the set of axioms that supports both the Shapley TU-value, and the Nash bargaining solution: It is easy to build examples 4 of symmetric games for which asymmetric payo¤s are selected by these three solutions. Where do these asymmetries come from? Perhaps a more detailed and explicit model of the bargaining rules that support each solution should be needed in order to understand the origin of these asymmetric payo¤s.
From this strategic approach, the only relevant proposal is the bargaining procedure proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996a) . This model is an elegant and simple variation of the alternating o¤ers method. It has the merit that it supports the Nash bargaining solution for pure bargaining games, the Shapley value for TU-games, and the Consistent solution for NTU-games. In brief, the model goes as follows:
3 Only for the particular case in which the boundary of the grand coalition is a hyperplane. 4 See Section 3 wherea two-person example is used extensively.
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Among the players 5 still in the bargaining, a proposer is chosen randomly (with uniform distribution). The proposer makes a feasible o¤er. If the rest of the players agree, this o¤er is the …nal payo¤. If any player rejects, with a prespeci…ed probability (0 < 1), a new proposer is chosen (among all of them) and the process is repeated again, and with probability (1 ) the proposer drops out of the game (receiving zero) and we restart the bargaining process with the remaining players, and so on. The process starts initially with all players.
This bargaining procedure is a sequential, perfect information game, and it has a stationary subgame perfect equilibria. Moreover, when the probability goes to one, the solution payo¤s associated to the equilibria converge to the consistent values. Moreover, in the same paper, some variations of this bargaining game are considered. And they obtain, in the authors'words, "...in particular, we allow for the possibility that players other than the proposer may be the victims of bargaining breakdown. However, we show that if the bargaining procedure yields the Shapley value in the TU-case, then necessarily the consistent value obtains in the NTU-case. Thus the consistent NTU-value is, according to our noncooperative approach, the appropriate generalization of the Shapley TU-value."
End of story?
First of all, note that this bargaining model does not yield a full support of the set of consistent payo¤ allocations, i.e. there are examples with consistent payo¤ allocations that cannot be approached (when ! 1) with the payo¤s associated to the stationary subgame perfect equilibria. This fact will be shown by the example discussed in Section 3: In this symmetric game there are three consistent payo¤s, two of them asymmetric and only one symmetric. The asymmetric points are the only ones that can be approached 5 From now on, we interpret players in a game as agents with neutral gender. They can be interpreted as automata, institutions or so on. Therefore we will avoid choosing their gender every time.
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by the equilibrium payo¤s, with just the symmetric payo¤ being excluded.
There is a crucial step in the design of the negotiation model that is responsible for this asymmetry, and we can enunciate it by using the same authors'words:
"The key modeling issue is the speci…cation of what happens if there is no agreement and, as a consequence, the game moves to the next stage. It is at this point that subgroups are made to matter by allowing for the possibility of partial breakdown of negotiations.
Clearly, there are many ways to model such a partial breakdown. In the body of this paper we concentrate on a particular and simple class: disagreement puts only the proposer in jeopardy. That is, after his proposal is rejected, the proposer may cease to be an active participant."
Note that the cause of a rejection is due to the fact that the proposer o¤ers less than what the responder expect to obtain. But who is the player responsible for such a breakdown? The proposer, o¤ering too little, or the responder rejecting the o¤er because he wish for too much? An anonymous rule should not specify who is to blame for this breakdown, except if the rule itself computes what the right o¤er must be; but in that case the rule determines directly the right outcome without the help of the players. The HM-model identi…es the proposer as being the only player responsible for the lack of agreement, giving him a chance (1 ) to live the game after a rejected proposal.
In this paper we show that it is possible to yield strategic support for single-valued NTU-solutions, by changing the breakdown procedure, in such a way that, after rejection, the probability of leaving the game will be the same for all players (proposer and responders), making all of them responsible for the lack of agreement. There are several ways in which this can be done. We show two of them, which di¤er from the HM-model only in the rules of breakdown.
The simplest way to make this type of modi…cation was already mentioned in Hart and 5 Mas-Colell (1996a), Section 6. There, they propose several modi…cations of the bargaining procedure, and this is the case (d) from their list:
-Random removal. All players (proposer and responders) drop out with equal probability. The player that leaves the game receives a payo¤ of zero, and the rest restart the bargaining process.
The authors mention that in the TU-case "The resulting solution is di¤erent from the previous ones (thus, it is neither the Shapley value nor the equal split solution 6 ). However, for a large n, it is easy to see that it is close to the equal split solution".
Nevertheless, the interest of this modi…cation relapses into the solution obtained in the NTU-case. It satis…es both requirements mentioned above: Single-valuedness and symmetry. Moreover, it yields the Nash bargaining solution in pure bargaining games, and the solidarity value of Nowak and Radzik (1994) in TU-games.
The second modi…cation proposed is a bit more elaborate, but has the advantage that the solution obtained …ts into the Shapley value generalization program.
-Random marginal. A new proposer is chosen (among all of them) with equal probability. The proposer makes an ultimatum o¤er. If the rest of the players agree, this o¤er is the …nal payo¤. If any player rejects, the proposer drops out of the game (receiving zero) and we restart the bargaining process with the remaining players.
Thus, in the ultimatum o¤er, the proposer knows for sure that they will leave the game in case of rejection. The di¤erence between the random removal and random dictator is that, in random removal the player selected leaves the game directly, and in the random dictator, the player selected makes an o¤er, and it is only under rejection that the player leaves the game. Now, the resulting solution supported by this bargaining procedure yields a new so-6 That is, the payo¤s are shared equally beween the players of the coalition.
6 lution in the NTU-case that it is again single-valued, and satis…es symmetry. When we deal with TU-games the Shapley value is selected, and in Hyperplane games it is the Consistent NTU-value. The price to pay relies on the fact that in pure bargaining problems the solution obtained is di¤erent from the Nash bargaining solution. The point selected is the maximization of utility gains from a breakdown point, so it is similar to the Nash solution (maximization of utility gains from the disagreement point), and the breakdown point is an average of the ideal points, from which the Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) solution is based. So it has elements of both solutions in its de…nition.
Following this Introduction, Section 2 is devoted to preliminary de…nitions and notations. Section 3 presents the bargaining model of Hart and Mas-Colell and the modi…ca-tions that yield the random marginal and the random removal bargaining models. The proposals corresponding to an equilibrum, for both bargaining models, are characterized in NTU-games. In Section 4 some two-person games are used to see the similarities and di¤erences of the limit points associated to these models. Sections 5 and 6 are devoted to the characterization of the random marginal and random removal values in TU-games an NTU-games respectively. Finally, Section 7 explores in large games the connections between the random marginal value and the Shapley NTU-value, and between the random removal value and the equal split value.
De…nitions
Let N = f1; :::; ng be a …nite set of players. A coalition is a subset of N . let P (N ) be the set of all coalitions of N . The cardinality of a coalition S is denoted by s. If x; y 2 R N ,
we write x y if x i y i for all i 2 N , and x > y if x i > y i for all i 2 N . Given two vectors x; y 2 R N , we use the notation x y := P i2N x i y i , and x y := (x i y i ) i2N . If
x 2 R N and ; 6 = S N , we write x S as the restriction of x to S, i.e.,
A. The boundary of A is denoted by @A. We say that the boundary is non level if for all x 2 @A it holds that fxg R N + \ @A = fxg. A non-transferable utility game (NTU-game for short), is a map V assigning to each coalition S, ; 6 = S N , a subset V (S) R S of attainable payo¤ vectors for players in S.
several regularity conditions are imposed such as:
is non-empty, closed, convex and comprehensive. 1. Transferable utility games (TU-games), when for each coalition S there is a number
who use a totally divisible good to make the coalitional payo¤s is an example of this type of games. If V is a TU-game, it will be denoted also by v.
2.
Hyperplane games (H-games), when @V (S) is a hyperplane for all S N . That is, for each coalition S there exists a number v(S) and a vector S 2 R S ++ such that V (S) = fy 2 R S : S y v(S)g: For example, prize games can be modeled in this way:
8 Each coalition S N has a prize S . The prize S is indivisible, and only one member of S can receive it. The feasible set of each coalition S consists of all lotteries over which players in S get the prize S (for more details see Hart, 1994) .
3. Pure Bargaining games (PB-games), when 0 2 @V (S), for all S 6 = N . Pure Bargaining games are usually described by a pair (0; V (N )), where V (N ) is the utility feasible set attainable by unanimity agreements of all members of N , and 0 is the utility feasible payo¤s vector obtained in case of disagreement. The fact that no other than the grand coalition can make agreements is precisely re ‡ected by 0 2 @V (S), for all S 6 = N .
Remark. In the normalization assumption A.3, it is worth noting that we have been making the implicit assumption that the utilities are previously normalized in such a way that when any player leaves the game, the payo¤ that it obtains is zero. 
The bargaining model
We describe here the multilateral bargaining procedures, based on the random removal and random marginal approach, within the general setting of NTU-games. These two approaches are based on the HM-model, and hence have a similar structure. For this reason, in order to see more clearly the di¤erences and similarities between them, we describe the three models at the same time.
We specify now the sequential noncooperative games which specify the rules of bargaining. The three models only di¤er in what happens if breakdown occurs 7 .
Let an NTU-game V 2 G and 0 < 1 be a …xed parameter:
In each round there is a set S N of active players, and a proposer i 2 S. In the …rst round, the active set is S = N . The proposer is chosen at random out of S, with all players in S being equally likely to be selected. The proposer makes a feasible o¤er a S;i 2 V (S). If all members of S accept it -they are asked in some prespeci…ed order-then the game ends with these payo¤s. If it is rejected by even one member of S, then, with probability , we move to a next round where the set of active players is again S and, with probability 1 , breakdown occurs.
HM-breakdown:
The proposer i drops out -leaves the game, receiving a payo¤ of zero-and we move to a next round where the set of active players becomes
RR-breakdown (random removal): A player j is chosen at random from S to drop out, being equally likely to be selected, and we move to a next round where the set of active players becomes Snj.
RM-breakdown (random marginal):
A player j is chosen at random from S to make an ultimatum o¤er, being equally likely to be selected: Proposer j 10 makes a feasible o¤er u S;j 2 V (S). If all members of S accept it -they are asked in some prespeci…ed order-then the game ends with these payo¤s. If it is rejected by even one member of S, then j drops out and we move to a next round where the set of active players becomes Snj.
The negotiation games have potentially in…nitely many periods, and with more than two active players, it is well known that many subgame perfect equilibria strategies appear.
Hence, as usual, we restrict ourselves to considering only stationary strategies. Therefore, the choice at each stage only depends on the set of active players S and on the current proposer i. Given a pro…le of stationary strategies, denoted by a S;i ( ), for i 2 S N , the proposal when the set of active players is S and the proposer is i. The average of these proposals is de…ned by a S ( ) := (1=s)
We recall …rst the equations that characterize the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SP) of the HM-model (Proposition 1, Hart and Mas-Colell, 1996a) .
Proposition 1
The proposals corresponding to an SP equilibrium are always accepted, and they are characterized by:
Sni ( ) for all i; j 2 S N with i 6 = j. Moreover, these proposals are nonnegative.
The proposition says that i makes o¤ers such that they will obtain their maximum payo¤ compatible by giving to the rest of players what they would expect to obtain in the continuation of the game if the o¤er were rejected, i.e., for every responder j 6 = i, they will get their expected payo¤ a j S ( ) when the active player set is S again, with probability 9 We denote the cardinality of a …nite set Sby s:
, and a j Sni ( ) when the active player set is Sni, with probability (1 ) of i dropping out.
In the next two propositions we characterize the conditions of an SP equilibrium in the RR and RM-breakdown models. They only di¤er in what players can expect to get in the continuation of the game in case of breakdown.
For any S N , de…ne
, where (0; a Snj ( )) 2 R S is the payo¤ vector in which player j drops out receiving 0, and players k 6 = j receive a k Snj ( ).
Proposition 2 The proposals corresponding to an SP equilibrium in the RR-breakdown model are always accepted, and are characterized by:
) for all i; j 2 S N with i 6 = j. Moreover, these proposals are nonnegative.
For the RM-breakdown model the proposition is very similar. For any S N , we de…ne u S ( ) := (1=s) P j2S u S;j ( ), where u S;j ( ) 2 R S is the ultimatum o¤er when player j 2 S is selected as proposer in the RM-breakdown.
Proposition 3
The proposals corresponding to an SP equilibrium in the RM-breakdown model are always accepted, and are characterized by:
The proof of Propositions (RR) and (RM) are rather similar of the HM-model (see Proposition 1, in Hart and Mas-Colell, 1996a ). In particular, Proposition (RR) is just case (d) of proposition 9, of Hart and Mas-Colell (1996a) . So we will pay attention only to the RM-model.
Proof.
It is proceeded by induction. It can be easily checked for the 1-player case.
Let (a S;i ( ); u S;i ( )), for i 2 S N , be the proposals of a given SP equilibrium. Assume by induction hypothesis that RM.1-RM.4 are satis…ed for S 6 = N . We see …rstly that, in case of breakdown, u S;i ( ) satis…es RM.3 and RM.4 for any i 2 N . Because it is assumed that a S;i ( ) 2 @V (S) and a S;i ( ) 0 for i 2 S 6 = N , monotonicity and convexity Let u N ( ) := (1=n)
10 In this indi¤erent case, mixed strategies also yield the same outcome.
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Denote by c N the expected payo¤ vector for the members of N: By convexity it must be c N 2 V (N ), and also c N ( )
j N;i ( ) is the expected payo¤ of j following a rejection of i's proposal. therefore d N;i ( ) is the best proposal that will be accepted if i is the proposer. Moreover, any proposal of i which is rejected yields to i at most
Hence, player i will propose a N;i ( ) = d N;i ( ) and the proposal will be accepted, and therefore
note that the following strategy will guarantee to any i a payo¤ of at least u 
Given the strategies of the other players, i can not increase their payo¤ from proposals that are accepted, and making proposals that were systematically rejected they could only yield the chance to go to the breakdown stage, which gives u N ( ) as expected payo¤s. Whereas the suggested strategies yields a N ( ) which is a better outcome (a N ( ) u N ( )).
A two-person example
In the …rst example we illustrate the problem in which players can be involved when they follow a solution concept that does not satisfy the uniqueness requirement.
Let us suppose there are two players who both claim an indivisible good. In addition, assume that this good can be owned either by only one player or shared by both simultaneously. The players have the same preferences and they are risk neutral. The set of pure feasible outcomes is A = fO 1 ; O 2 ; S; Eg, where O i (i = 1; 2) means that the good is only for player i, S means that the good is shared by both players, and E means that the good is for nobody. We normalize the utilities as follows:
Here the set of players is N = f1; 2g and the characteristic function V is built as follows: If a player renounces their claim, they "leave"the game, and then the good is for the other, hence
When both players claim for the good, they can either agree on any pure outcome in A, or on any lottery in A (for example, tossing a coin to decide if the good is only for
). Therefore the feasible expected payo¤s that both claimants can guarantee by cooperation are established by the convex hull of u(A) = f(50; 50); (75; 0); (0; 75); (0; 0)g. Therefore,
("conv" denotes "convex hull"). The sets V ( ) are also comprehensive (utility is freely disposable). V (N ) is represented in Figure 1 . Apply now the Hart and Mas-Colell (1996a) bargaining procedure to our example.
The equilibrium equations which determine the proposals in N are xN;i( ) 2 @V (N ), for all i 2 N , and
That is, player i o¤ers to player j just what they will get in the case of rejecting the proposal: x N ( ) in case the game repeats, and r j in case breakdown happens, being player i the only claimant that remains in the game.
11 It can easily be checked that these three points also belong to the set of Shapley and Harsanyi NTU-solutions of this game.
It can be checked that equations both equations imply that
which, in our example, yield two di¤erent solutions: fa N;1 ( ); a N;2 ( )g and fb N;1 ( ); b N;2 ( )g that, when ! 1, they converge to a and b respectively (see Figure 2 ). 
Limit points when ! 1.
First, note that this bargaining procedure does not always allow an approximation to all payo¤ solutions: In our example, point c = (50; 50) is excluded. Secondly, we have multiplicity: we can approximate either a or b. If we have no previous reasons to discriminate between claimants 1 and 2, a way to solve this impasse is to choose with a fair lottery between a and b by tossing a coin. But therefore, the expected payo¤s are Therefore, in this particular example, the breakdown expected payo¤s d and u coincide, and we denote this point (37:5; 37:5) by h. It follows that in both bargaining models, the equilibrium equations which determine the proposals in N are xi ( ) 2 @V (N ), for all i 2 N , and
x N;2 ( ). It can be easily checked that
Therefore, when ! 1, we have ci ( ) ! c ( ) for i = 1; 2, and c ( ) ! c = (50; 50) Hence, we fall into the classical approach to the Nash Bargaining solution from the disagreement 18 point h, which, in our example, is the point that maximizes the product of the utility gains from the reference point h (see Figure 3) .
Limit point in the random marginal and random removal models.
Although in this example our procedure yields, in the limit, a point that belongs to the set of Consistent NTU-value allocations, i.e. the point c = (50; 50), this fact is not true in general, as can be seen in the following two examples.
In the pure bargaining game of Figure 4 , the random marginal model yields at the limit the point = (60; 40) that maximizes the product of utility gains taken from the breakdown point u = (50; 30). The random removal model yields in the limit the Nash solution (which coincides with the Shapley, Harsanyi and Consistent NTU-value), i.e., point N = (50; 50) that maximizes the product of utility gains from disagreement point d = (0; 0). 
Random marginal
Let v be a TU-game. For each coalition S N and player i 2 S, let
be the marginal contribution of player i to coalition S in the TU-game v. The Shapley value in the game v is the payo¤ con…guration ' = (' S (v)) s N de…ned by
Alternatively, this value can be obtained recursively 12 by
starting with
In the Proposition (RM) we have seen that the rules of the bargaining guarantee that the equilibrium payo¤s a S of the negotiation stages will always be greater than or equal to the breakdown payo¤s u S , for all S N . This fact implies the next straightforward Theorem.
12 See in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996a) , the Remark of Section 4..
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Theorem 4 Let (a S ( ); u S ( )) S N be the equilibrium payo¤s con…guration associated to the RM-breakdown model. Then a( ) = (a S ( )) S N coincides with the Shapley value for TU-games, for any .
Proof. Let V be a TU-game. By (RM.3)
, for all S N . Moreover, a S;i ( ) u S ( ), and
By (RM.3), (RM.4), and
The payo¤s of the single coalitions f {g, are a independent of . This implies that the ultimatum payo¤s for two-player coalitions are also independent of , and equal to
By increasing the size of the coalitions, this recursive argument shows that the equilibrium payo¤s are independent of , and equal to
It is interesting to note the di¤erences with the results for the HM-model in the TU-case. In the HM-model, we have that a S ( ) = ' S (v), and a S;i ( ) ! ' S (v) when ! 1, for all i 2 S N . It means that in the RM-model there is no di¤erence between being the proposer or the responder, whereas in the HM-model this is not the case. So, in the TU-case, in the RM-model the bargaining part (in which players make proposals and counterproposals) is irrelevant, because they are strongly determined by the breakdown part. For this reason, if one wishes to support the Shapley value, the bargaining can be simpli…ed with only two moves, for each round of active players set S: First choose randomly a proposer out of S (equally likely). If the proposal is rejected, then randomly choose again another proposer out of S (equally likely) to make an ultimatum proposal. If it is rejected, then the proposer drops out of the game and proceed to a new round with the remaining players as the new active set.
Random removal
Let v be a TU-game. For each coalition S N , let
be the average marginal contribution of a player to coalition S in the TU-game v. The solidarity value in the game v is the payo¤ con…guration = ( S (v)) s N de…ned by
This value was introduced in Nowak and Radzik (1994) . Similarly to the Shapley value, it can be easily checked that this value can be obtained recursively by Theorem 5 Let (a S ( )) S N be the equilibrium payo¤s con…guration associated to the RR-breakdown model. Then a( ) = (a S ( )) S N coincides with the solidarity value for TU-games, for any .
Proof. Let V be a TU-game. By (RR.1), for any i 2 S N , we have
which yields
Applying (RR.2),
which, applying (RR.1) again, yields
Note that
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Then we obtain
The payo¤s of the single coalitions f {g, are a 
NTU-games
In this section we see that the Random marginal and the Random Removal models each support a single-valued solution in the class of NTU-games.
Random marginal. To characterize the value associated to the RM-model we need to de…ne the concept of marginal contributions associated to a payo¤ con…guration. Let V be an NTU-game and let x = (x S ) S N be an e¢ cient payo¤ con…guration. For each coalition S containing player i let
Note that if V 2 G and x S 2 V 0 (S) for all S N , @ Remark. The value of the Consistent NTU-solution in Hyperplane games can also be de…ned recursively 13 by
where x = (' S (V )) S N , starting with '
Because @V (S) is a hyperplane, in the RM-model it occurs that u S ( ) 2 @V (S), so again we have that a S;i ( ) = a S ( ) = u S ( ) as in Theorem (4). Applying the same arguments as there, we can reproduce for the Consistent NTU-solution in Hyperplane games the same result that as Theorem (4) yields for the Shapley value in TU-games.
We now proceed to de…ne the NTU-value supported by the RM-model. Condition (a) states that the payo¤ vector a S is e¢ cient for coalition S. Condition (b) ensures that a S is also S -utilitarian, i.e., that it maximizes the sum of the Srescaled payo¤s. Condition (c) is a S -egalitarian condition: The gains of the players 13 See formula (3) in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996a) .
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in a S with respect to the vector u S are equal relative to the units given by S . The payo¤ vector u S has the following interpretation: The payo¤ allocation a Sni ; @ i a (V; S) speci…es the choice of player i 2 S if this player has the dictatorial power to choose for S, under the restriction that the others players in S have at their disposal a Sni . Vector
gives the expected payo¤ allocation for players in S if each member has an equal chance of obtaining this dictatorial power 14 . Note that condition (c) can be rewritten as
, for all i; j 2 S. 
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where in that case S must be collineal to the vector
, and point a S is unique.
When V is an H-game, or a TU-game, it holds that all u S 2 @V 0 (S), for all S N , and therefore a S = u S . Hence, formulas (2) and (1) Proof. Existence.
Assume that V 2 G: We prove the existence following a recursive argument. Given In this recursive way we prove the existence of payo¤ con…guration proposals (a S;i ( ) ; u S;i ( )) i2S N which satisfy (RM.1)-(RM.4) and, by Proposition (RM), they correspond to an SP equilibrium.
Convergence.
Consider a convergence sequence f r g ! 1 when r ! 1. Therefore, in the limit, it holds that a S;i = a S , for all i 2 S N .
Suppose now that V satis…es also the smoothness assumption (A.5). Let (a S ) ; (u S ) S N be the limit payo¤ con…guration as before, where u S = 1 s P i2S u S;i , for all S N . First, note that a i fig = r i , then it trivially holds that a fig = fig (V ) , for all i 2 N .
Let a coalition S N , with s 2. Let S ( ) 2 R S ++ be de…ned either by an outward normal to @V (S) if u S ( ) 2 @V (S), or by the vector
(note that in this case a 
To check this, if u S ( ) 2 @V (S), this holds by de…nition of S ( ). If u S ( ) = 2 @V (S), we 29 have that
hence,
Denote by S ( ) = S ( )
we have that S ( ) ! S , where S is the outward unit length normal to @V (S) at a S 15 ;
S being collineal to the vector
when u S = 2 @V (S). Therefore, for S , a S , and u S , conditions (a), (b), and (c), of De…nition (6) are satis…ed.
The unicity of the limit payo¤ con…guration (a S ) ; (u S ) S N follows by a straightforward induction argument. Because a i fig = r i , for all i 2 N , the breakdown payo¤s u S are uniquely determined for all S N , such that s = 2. This implies the uniqueness of limit points a S , for coalitions of size s = 2. This fact implies again the uniqueness of limit points u S , and hence the uniqueness of limit points a S , for coalitions of size s = 3, and so on and so forth up to the grand coalition N .
Remark. Asymmetric solutions can be easily de…ned. We need only assume that the proposers are chosen to be the proposer with di¤erent probabilities. Let w 2 R N ++ be a 15 Note here that for jS 3j the set of equilibrium o¤ers a S;i ( ) is not necessarily a singleton; and without smoothness on @V (S), the convergence to S (V ) may fail too. See Prooposition 8.1, and Remark 3, in Section 8, of Thomson and Lensberg (1989) .
vector of weights, and assume that the proposers are chosen in proportion to these weights.
In particular, when V is an H-game, it holds that the asymmetric solution coincides with the weighted Shapley (1953) value for TU-games (see Kalai and Samet, 1985; and Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989) , and with the weighted Consistent NTU-value for H-games (See Maschler and Owen, 1989; and Calvo, García and Zarzuelo, 2001 ).
Random removal. The solidarity value in NTU-games can be de…ned as follows.
De…nition 9 Let V 2 G and a= (a S ) S N be a payo¤ con…guration. Then a is the Solidarity value of V (i.e., a = (V )) if and only if for each S N there exists a vector De…nition 10 If V 2 G, then the solidarity value of V exists and it is unique. Moreover, if V is a TU-game, then (V ) coincides with the solidarity TU-value of V . Theorem 11 Let V 2 G be an NTU-game. Then for each 0 < 1 there is an SP equilibrium of the RR-model. Moreover, if V satis…es the additional assumption (A.5), when ! 1, every SP equilibrium payo¤ con…guration a( ) converges to a = (V ).
The proofs are fully identical to the RM-model, interchanging the roles of u S by d S , hence they are left to the reader.
Remark. The solidarity value has an interesting link with the equal split solution, relative to (0; :::; 0). In Hart and Mas-Colell (1996a) , for all i 2 S N . Hart and Mas-Collel mention that, in TU-games, the solidarity value approaches, for a large n, the equal split value. We will con…rm this assertion for large NTU-games in the next Section.
Remark. The properties of Uniqueness and Symmetry are the main motivation of the paper. By Uniqueness we mean that the payo¤ con…guration of the solution is single-valued. This property is important if we consider a solution as a way to …nd an agreement when an alternative must be chosen over a set that produces a di¤erent rank of preferences. This lack of unanimity is not solved when a solution selects a subset of alternatives, because we again have the same ranking problem among players, but now over the subset selected. The example of Section 2 shows that neither the Shapley, holds that x 2 V (T ) (note that the case S = T is included). We say that a solution satis…es Symmetry if it selects symmetric payo¤s when the game V is symmetric, i.e.
for every x 2 (V ),
S for all i; j 2 S N . Because the Nash solution satis…es symmetry for Pure Bargaining games, and given the way in which the random marginal and the solidarity NTU-values are built, it can be checked that they also satisfy Symmetry in G.
A full axiomatic characterization of these new solutions is not yet accomplished, and should be the object of further research.
Large games
The aim of this Section is a study of how the random marginal and the solidarity values should behave in large games with non-transferable utility. More speci…cally, we will consider only di¤erentiable market games for which the Value equivalence theorem holds (Aumann, 1975) ; that is, the equivalence between the value allocations and the core allocations. The basic references and results in this topic can be found in Hart (1994, and . 16 For the Consistent NTU-value a three-person example of non unicity can be found in Owen (1994) .
We restrict our analysis to the case of continuum games with …nitely many types of players, where each coalition is characterized by its composition. Let N = f1; :::; ng be the set of types. The pro…le of a coalition is a vector x 2 R N + , where x i is the mass of players of type i in the coalition. The game form will specify the sets of feasible payo¤ vectors for all coalitions. We consider only type-symmetric imputations, where all players of the same type get the same payo¤ 17 . For every x 2 R N + , let V (x) R N be the set of feasible per-capita payo¤ vectors for a coalition with pro…le x. This point-to-set map V is called the NTU-game form. Given V we de…ne also the set of feasible total per-type payo¤s byV (x) := fx a :
) is the continuum TU-game associated to V with utility comparison weights . We will make the following assumptions: (where ! i is the initial endowment), yields a market game satisfying C.1-C.3. Di¤eren-tiability allows us to set the condition that characterizes the RM-value in terms of a …rst order partial di¤erential equations system.
Remark. Note that the di¤erentiability ofv(x; ) implies both the smoothness of @V (x), and the strict convexity of V (x). Therefore there is a unique a 2 V (x) such that (a x) =v(x; ). Conversely, for any a 2 @V (x) there is a unique , such that
That is, there is a unique supporting hyperplane toV (x) at a x, being its corresponding outward normal vector.
Random marginal. We now see how the conditions to be a random marginal value will look for large games. As in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996b) , given a continuum game V and the grand coalition x 2 R N ++ , we obtain a sequence of …nite games V r , for r = 1; 2; :::; with the set of players N r := fi 1 ; :::; i r g i2N ; where there is a set of types N , having for each type i 2 N , r symmetric players, each one being regarded as having a mass of Our assumptions imply that each …nite gameV r has a unique per-capita random marginal value a r = (V r ), and for every S N r it holds that a r;S 2 @V r (S) \ R S + . Given a continuum game V and coalition x 2 R N ++ de…ne the per capita asymptotic random marginal value by a(x) := lim r!1 a r;Nr , where a r;Nr is the per capita RM-value for the grand coalition N r of the …nite game V r 18 . Because @V r (N )\R S + = @V (x)\R S + is a compact set, the existence of such limit points is a guarantee (taken the appropriate subsequence).
Nevertheless, given the uniqueness of a r;Nr for every r, we have the plausible conjecture that the set of limit points is single valued, and the family of continuum games in which the value is well de…ned is still a conjecture.
A very relevant consequence of the uniqueness of the RM-value for each …nite approximation V r is that if the continuum game V is homogeneous then the asymptotic RM-value, if it does converge, must also be single-valued and homogeneous. On the contrary, denote by a(x) the asymptotic RM-value for the grand coalition x, and suppose that for two di¤erent t; t 0 > 0, it holds that a(tx) 6 = a(t 0 x). By homogeneity,
therefore a(tx) and a(t 0 x) must also be solutions for V at x. Then, for a large enough r, and for all r r, there must be a r;Nr close to a(tx), and a 
More general convergence sequences of r-approximations could be de…ned, for example, by allowing di¤erent r i 's for di¤erent i's. But even for this symmetric de…nition, the limit approach is hard enough.
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Where
Taken limits, when r ! 1, the e¢ cient condition a r;Nr 2 @V r (N r ) turns into condition
The -utilitarian condition (b) takes the form
Note that, under the di¤erentiability assumption, the (x) associated to a(x) is unique (up to length normalization).
For the -egalitarian condition (c'), the increments are replaced by derivatives, so they take the form
De…ne i;Nr := a r;Nrnkr ; @ k ar (V r ; N r ) ; then, by construction, i;Nr 2 @V r (N r ) = @V (x). Let i;Nr be its unique associated outward normal vector. Then it holds that
When r ! 1, i;Nr ! a(x) and i;Nr ! (x). and hence
All together they suggest the following de…nition:
De…nition 13 Let V be a continuum game with a …nite type of players N , satisfying (C.1), (C.2), and (C.4). Let a(x) be a C 1 per capita payo¤ con…guration,
(ii) (x) (x a(x)) =v (x; (x)); and
Condition (iii) is a system of …rst order partial di¤erential equations, and if the asymptotic RM-value does exist, then it must be a particular solution of (i)-(iii). We now see the relationship between the asymptotic RM-value and the Shapley NTU-value in continuum games. The construction of a Shapley NTU-value in continuum games is as follows (see Shapley, 1969; and Shapley and Shubik, 1969) .
Given a continuum game V , and a vector of weights 2 R N ++ , build the continuum TU-gamev (x; ). Under di¤erentiability, the Aumann- Shapley (1974) Proof. Let a(x) be a continuum MR-value of V at x, and assume that it is homogenous. Because V (x) is homogenous of degree 0, a(x) also has the same degree of homogeneity. Therefore, by Euler's formula, P k2N x k @a i (x) @x k = 0, and hence condition (iii) is equivalent to i (x)a i (x) @v (x; (x)) @x i = k; for all i 2 N , where k 2 R. By multiplying this expression by x i , and adding it over all i, we have
By condition (ii), P Note that, in the payo¤ con…guration a, e¢ ciency (and hence, feasibility) is only required for the grand coalition N . Condition (f) is the -Balanced Contributions property.
The main drawback of this de…nition is given by the possible non-feasibility of the threat points a S , for all S 6 = N (except in the TU-case).
By using similar arguments as above, in the continuum, conditions (a') and (b) turn into (i) and (ii); and condition (f) into
@a j (x) @x i , for all i; j 2 N .
Conditions (iii) and (iv) can also be compared with condition
, for all i 2 N .
This condition, jointly with (i) and (ii), characterizes the Consistent NTU-values in continuum games (see Owen, 1996, and Leviatan, 2002) . , for all i; j 2 S: 40 Therefore, by using similar arguments as for the RM-value, we can de…ne the solidarity value in continuum games as follows:
De…nition 17 Let V be a continuum game with a …nite type of players N , satisfying (C.1), (C.2), and (C.4). Let a(x) be a C 1 per capita payo¤ con…guration, x 2 R N ++ . Then a(x) is a continuum solidarity value of V at x, if there exists (x) 2 R N ++ such that (i) a(x) 2 @V (x);
, for all i; j 2 N:
Given the uniqueness of the solidarity value for …nite games, we can also conjecture that the asymptotic solidarity value exists and it is single valued. Moreover, in homogeneous games it must also be a homogeneous value. Hence it implies that, under Aumann, R.J., and L.S. Shapley (1974) : Values of Non-atomic Games. Princeton University Press.
